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How the United States' Constitutional
Doctrine Is a Main Contributor to Eroded
Privacy
TIFFANY KIM*
INTRODUCTION
Since the nineteenth century, privacy concerns have increased with
the growth of technology. The invention of instantaneous photography,
coupled with the enlarged presence of press, was met with concerns of
degraded privacy.1 Society has formed expectations of privacy, but as
time passes, those expectations continue to diminish. Younger
generations have been socialized to accept lessened levels of privacy in
this digitalized world of mass data and connectivity. 2
Individual privacy expectations vary globally. The construction of
China's government and culture produces a lesser expectation of
individual privacy than that of the United States. As outlined in the
U.S. Constitution, U.S. citizens expect freedom from government
surveillance without an authorized warrant,3 which is inconsistent with
the privacy expectations of Chinese citizens.
This essay first discusses an article by Cyrus Farivar,4 followed by
an article by Ava Kofman, I both of which relate to mass data collection
* Symposium Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 26; J.D. Candidate,
2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., Criminal Justice,
2016, Grand Valley State University.
1. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890) (discussing the evolution of privacy law).
2. I use the word "connectivity" to describe the abundance of devices that we use on a
daily basis that connect to the Internet, including our vehicles, TVs, phones, watches,
toasters, and bed comforters.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Cyrus Farivar, Axon Wants You (Yes, You!) to Submit Photos, Videos to Police, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 19, 2017, 5:29 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/axon-
wants-you-yes-you-to-submit-photos-videos-to-police/.
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in the United States. This note will discuss how the expectation of
privacy continues to diminish as younger generations are being
socialized to willingly accept a lesser degree of individual privacy.
Additionally, this note will examine an article by Rachel Botsman 6
which describes a Chinese mass data collection initiative currently
underway that-were it to be implemented in the United States-would
perceivably be categorized as a farfetched, outrageous initiative.
Finally, this essay analyzes the grave effects new technologies and
practices will have on diminishing privacy and asserts that China's
perceivably outrageous mass data collection practices would survive
U.S. constitutional bars if the current constitutional doctrine is applied.
AXON CITIZEN WILL FURTHER SOCIALIZE PEOPLE TO ACCEPT DIMINISHED
PRIVACY
In an age where the vast majority of individuals possess a camera in
their pocket on a daily basis, concerns for privacy are drastically
heightened. Axon, a technology company that is the largest provider of
body-worn cameras and data storage products to American law
enforcement agencies, announced its launch of Axon Citizen.7
Essentially, Axon Citizen is a "public safety portal[,]"8 which allows
anyone to share information with law enforcement by submitting text,
video, and audio files to Evidence.con, a law enforcement cloud storage
interface.9 Axon's product gained support and investment because it
gives police more technology and resources for information gathering
and would cut investigation expenses. 10
Although Axon Citizen and Evidence.com have shown potential
benefits for solving crime, there are prominent privacy concerns that
accompany the unregulated mass data collection initiative. The
standard policing practices and procedures for implementing and
operating the public safety portal are still ambiguous with numerous
questions left unanswered. For instance, what is the policy regulating
the length of data retention? "Will either Axon or the individual agency
5. Ava Kofman, Taser Wants to Build an Army of Smartphone Informants, THE
INTERCEPT (Sept. 21, 2017, 11:54 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/09/2 1/taser-wants-to-
build- an-army-of- smartphone-informants/.
6. Rachel Botsman, Big Data Meets Big Brother as China Moves to Rate Its Citizens,
WIRED (Oct. 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-government-social-credit-
score-privacy-invasion.
7. See Farivar, supra note 4 (describing how Axon announced the launch of Axon
Citizen, a public safety portal for evidence upload, on Thursday, October 19, 2017).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id.
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be pulling out data that's unrelated to the particular event being
reported, whether it's license plate data in the background or
individuals tagged down the line by facial recognition software? Will
they be mined for leads for other crimes?" 11
If citizens can submit any video they captured, does the distinction
between a public and a private setting matter? In 1958, Hannah Arendt
asserted that absolute privacy is only obtainable within the four walls of
the home.12 The decision in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. reflects this
concept of privacy, where a husband and wife were captured by a
photographer as they were seated in an affectionate pose at a farmers
market. 13 The couple did not know or consent to their photograph being
taken, let alone consent to it being published and widely circulated, yet
the court held that there was no privacy violation because they were in
public. 14 To the contrary, in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, a mother
who escorted her two young children through a fun house at the fair was
photographed as she exited the fun house with her dress blown up by
the air, and the court held the defendant who published the photograph
violated the mother's right to privacy. 15 The court concluded that being
in the public sphere did not provide an absolute defense because such a
mechanical application of legal principles would produce an illogical
conclusion.16 Here, the court focused on the obscene nature of the
photograph. Synthesizing the Gill and Graham decisions, if you are in
public, you do not have a right to privacy in regards to having your
photograph taken, unless the photograph is obscene.
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify privacy in public as it
relates to Fourth Amendment protections by describing how society has
formed a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain public places. In
Katz v. United States, the government placed a recording device outside
a telephone booth-without a warrant.17 Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion declared that the defendant did have a reasonable expectation
11. Farivar, supra note 4.
12. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958) (discussing the
relationship between the public and private realms and how individual privacy is
achieved).
13. See Gillv. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 441-42 (Cal. 1953).
14. See id. (noting that the picture taken was not offensive or shocking to the ordinary
sense of decency).
15. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 474-75 (Ala. 1964) (noting
that there was no legitimate news value in the photograph and the photograph was
embarrassing and obscene).
16. See id. at 478.
17. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348-50 (1967).
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of privacy inside a public phone booth where he had the door closed. 18
Harlan's concurrence promulgated the reasonable expectation of privacy
test, which calls for a two-step analysis: a subjective expectation of
privacy and whether society is willing to accept that subjective
expectation as objectively reasonable.19 In this decision, the Supreme
Court shifted the expectation of privacy to anywhere a person might
reasonably expect privacy, not simply a private-versus-public-sphere
categorization.
However, the reasonable expectation of privacy test requires the
court to assess the societal views of privacy, which has contributed to
the diminished privacy protections society is now forced to accept.2"
Societal expectations guide judicial rulings, which guide
societal expectations, and so on. That circularity is
especially problematic here at the onset of the
Information Age because digital communications and
data are only beginning to take their place in society.
Expectations about privacy in this medium are still
taking form, and the technology continues to change, so
there is simply no objectively reasonable sense of privacy
for judges to discover.2 1
The growth of technology, especially readily available cameras,
contributes to the simple expectation that a person cannot achieve
privacy in public spaces, which is a further deviation from Katz.
Furthermore, the categorization of public-versus-private does not
provide the flexibility that is needed, especially regarding information
privacy and data collection. Given the current digital society, privacy
should not hinge on the distinction between the public or private
sphere.22
18. See id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that even though an individual
was in public place, a person making a phone call with the telephone booth door shut
could rely upon the protections of the Fourth Amendment).
19. See id.
20. See Brief for the Competitive Enterprise Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at *14, Carpenter v. United States, 137 St. Ct. 2211 (2017) (No. 16-402), 2017
WL 2407484 (petition of writ of certiorari granted) (discussing how the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is insufficient and detrimental to individual privacy
protections).
21. Id.
22. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1132 (2002)
(asserting that public and private categorization is not effective because it changes
depending on the time and subcultures).
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Axon's Evidence.com will contribute to the socialization of accepting
less privacy. People will accept the fact that if they are in public, they
could be recorded, and the content about them could be stored in a
database. Courts have guided this socialization of diminished privacy by
defining the distinction between public-versus-private, especially in the
context of government actors versus private actors.
In addition to the public and private distinction, the judiciary
created the Third-party Doctrine, which essentially diminished the
privacy expectation individuals have in the information that is relayed
to a third-party. The Court promulgated the Third-party Doctrine in
United States v. Miller. The government issued blank form subpoenas to
bank presidents where the defendant had accounts. The banks provided
documents related to the defendant's accounts to the government that
were used to convict the defendant of four counts of possession of an
unregistered still and failure to pay taxes.23 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the conviction.24 The court held that the depositor's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated in this instance because banks must comply with
the Bank Secrecy Act when maintaining records, and the records were
obtained by a defective subpoena.25 The Supreme Court, however,
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit opinion reasoning that despite the
Bank Secrecy Act, the depositor has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that he provides to a third party.26 The court
further stated its holding.
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
him to Government authorities, even if the information
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.2 7
Contrary to the Miller Court's declaration that a depositor cannot
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that is conveyed
to a third party, the lack of privacy alarmed a clear bulk of society,
which suggests an objective reasonable expectation of privacy would not
23. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1976).
24. Id. at 437 (describing the procedural history and how the Court of Appeals held
that the bank records must be suppressed).
25. Id.
26. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 ("The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.").
27. Id.
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be so farfetched.28 Take Justice Marshall's dissent in Smith v. Maryland
for example.29 In an investigation of the defendant, who was suspected
of robbery and making threatening phone calls, the police requested
that the telephone company install a pen register-without a warrant.30
The majority held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation
because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers dialed, which were transmitted to the telephone company.31
The majority further declared that even if the defendant truly did have
a subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed, the
expectation is not one that society is willing to except.32 Justice
Marshall, however, was astonished by the majority's opinion that
individuals could not reasonably expect privacy in the phone numbers
that are dialed merely because the phone numbers are voluntarily
turned over to a third party.33 The majority reasoned that individuals
assume the risk of voluntarily disclosing information to a third party,
but Justice Marshall asserted that such an analysis is wrong because it
assumes people have a choice."
Consistent with Justice Marshall's lack-of-choice reasoning, Axon
Citizen creates an autonomy trap that will be detrimental to society's
privacy expectations. An autonomy trap exists when an individual
cannot exercise autonomy because there are simply no other reasonable
options.3 5 For example, disclosing cell phone data to the cell phone
provider is unavoidable, and one cannot choose to use a different cell
phone provider to avoid disclosing the phone numbers that are dialed;
therefore, this could be categorized as an autonomy trap. If an
28. See generally Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (1974) (holding, as a matter
of state constitutional law, that bank depositors have a sufficient expectation of privacy in
their bank records).
29. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748-51 (1979) (Marshall, T., dissenting) ("It is
idle to speak of'assuming risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have
no realistic alternative.").
30. Id. at 737 (describing a pen register as a device that records the numbers pressed
when dialing the telephone).
31. Id. at 742.
32. Id. at 744 ("When [petitioner] used his phone, [he] voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in
the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.").
33. See id. at 748-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 750 ("[U]nless a person is prepared to forgo use of what to many has
become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of
surveillance."); see also United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 894-95 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Stranch, J., concurring) (noting that the third-party doctrine is not suitable for modern
technology).
35. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 821
(2000).
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individual does not want to consent to potentially being video recorded
and uploaded to a privatized, obscure database, the only choice is to
never go out in public. Although many supporters of Evidence.com
advocate that it will only be used to investigate crime, grave privacy
concerns are absolutely justified when Evidence.com is an unregulated,
privatized database. 36
First, if body-camera footage is uploaded to Evidence.com, it could
include innocent individuals who are now part of a perpetual line-up,
indefinitely. 7 Second, it is unclear how Axon intends to exploit the
data.38 In the aggregate, data is powerful. Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall even recognized the close relationship between aggregation
and power in the information discarded in a residential trashcan. In
California v. Greenwood, police searched, without a warrant, opaque
garbage bags left for collection in front of the defendant's home.39 The
court held that items abandoned or exposed to the public, like garbage
in a trashcan, have been conveyed to a third party and that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a personal garbage can sitting on
the curb of a home.40 Yet two dissenting justices recognized that "a
single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and
recreational habits of the person who produced it."41 Information in the
aggregate, whether obtained from a trashcan or from third parties,
reveals intimate details about an individual's life and creates a platform
of commercial power over citizens' privacy.
PRIVATIZATION OF A PUBLIC SERVICE WILL FURTHER SOCIALIZE PEOPLE
TO ACCEPT DIMINISHED PRIVACY
Axon's new Public Evidence Product, or Evidence.com, benefits the
law enforcement tech giant with yet another source of data the company
can monetize. The CEO of Axon refers to the platform as a "dropbox for
cops" because it will allow citizens to submit photos or video evidence to
36. See Farivar, supra note 4.
37. See generally CLARE GARVIE ET AL., GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., THE
PERPETUAL LINE-UP (2016) (discussing the grave effects of unregulated mass data
collection to be used for facial recognition, producing vast constitutional and civil liberties
violations).
38. See Farivar, supra note 4.
39. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37-39 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 41 (majority opinion) ("[S]ociety would not accept as reasonable
respondents' claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area
accessible to the public....").
41. See id. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the intimate details a search of a
trash can reveal, including activities associated with the "sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life" which is at the epicenter of Fourth Amendment protections).
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Evidence.com, which will ultimately help law enforcement in crime
solving and gathering a "fuller point of view from the public."42 The
potential benefits of enhanced investigation techniques are met with
grave concern for the traditional public service role becoming
privatized.4 3 While the Intercept article discusses the same Axon Citizen
product in the Ars Technica article analyzed above, the Intercept article
expanded on privacy implications, potential intentions of Axon, and
video tactics that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
Witness have employed to combat police brutality.
Initially, body cameras were implemented to ensure police
accountability; however, the cameras are actually being operationalized
as surveillance tools for police.44 Stanley Benn asserts that surveillance,
or secret watching, in itself does not cause harm; therefore, surveillance
should not be based on harm done but rather on the principle of respect
for others.45 Conversely, Julie Cohen proclaims privacy is of the highest
value because it is crucial to constitutional protections, such as First
Amendment freedoms, and promotes the development of a civil society
where individuals are autonomous and free to explore eccentric
individuality.46 Cohen's perspective analyzes the purpose of privacy as a
collective right to protect democracy. Surveillance is extremely harmful
to a democratic society because it can chill an individual's freedom of
expression and exercise of civil liberties.47
Younger generations tend to distance themselves from the realities
of surveillance via mass data collection because it is not physical
42. See Kofman, supra note 5.
43. See id. ("This [trend] is happening in a million different ways, whether it's people
photographing evidence of crimes on Facebook or apps that allow you to take photographs
and report other people's parking violations. This is becoming more prominent, and more
and more minute offenses are being drawn into this vast surveillance dragnet.").
44. See id. (discussing how body cameras were initially advocated for the purpose of
increasing transparency and building trust between police and the public, but "body
camera footage has rarely been used to indict officers for brutality" and instead used to
turn beat cops into "walking surveillance cameras.").
45. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 53 (5th
ed. 2015) (quoting Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, from
Nomos XIL Privacy (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971)).
46. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1424-25 (2000) ("The recognition that anonymity shelters
constitutionally-protected decisions about speech, belief, and political and intellectual
association-decision that other might be chilled by unpopularity or simple difference-is
part of our constitutional tradition.").
47. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935
(2013) (discussing the importance of freedom for intellectual expression, such as forming
opinions on politics or social issues, and how surveillance of those activities is detrimental
when it deters an individual from exercising their freedom of expression in communicating
with others while forming opinions).
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surveillance; therefore, it is perceived as less intrusive or not intrusive
at all. Axon claims, however, that by conducting analytics on its video
database, such as Google or Amazon analytics, it will soon have the
capability to "anticipate criminal activity."48 It may be difficult to
fathom how this capability will actually be operationalized, but given
the relationship Axon has with the government, this type of analytics
will likely have drastic effects on privacy, not to mention the varied and
numerous racial profiling algorithms that are already a significant issue
with facial recognition software.4 9
Axon makes money through government subscriptions to their
database;50 given this dynamic, it is reasonable to assume the
anticipated criminal activity analytics will be at the disposal of law
enforcement but lack Fourth Amendment protections. Unlike technology
companies like Google, who do not voluntarily turn over information on
citizens without a valid search warrant or motion to compel,5 1 Axon's
clients are public sector entities. Axon is creating capabilities for law
enforcement, not the public; such a relationship not only lacks incentive
for Axon to protect the privacy of citizens but deters the protection of
privacy. This dynamic bestows power on the commercial and
government entities over the individual autonomy, which can lead to
coercion. 52
Axon will be analogous to facial recognition software that searches
databases containing photos from mugshots, driver's licenses, and
passports. 53 Axon Citizen and Cop Dropbox, or Evidence.com, are going
to further expand the perpetual line-up that lacks accountability,
accuracy, standard protocols, and, most worrisome of all, Fourth
48. Kofman, supra note 5.
49. See generally GARVIE ET AL., supra note 35 (discussing the grave effects of
unregulated mass data collection to be used for facial recognition, producing vast
constitutional and civil liberties violations, specifically with targeting racial minorities).
50. See Kofman, supra note 5.
51. The State of Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit reviewed three similar issues
regarding search warrants and granted the government's motion to compel Google to
produce all data described in the search warrant because Google did not voluntary
turnover the information requested. Google's involuntariness is reflected in three different
2017 In re Search Warrant cases: No. 16-MB-004413 (Addison Unit); No. 17AG000003
(Chittenden Unit); and No. 15AG000082 (Washington Unit).
52. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 112, 114-15 (2007) ("First Amendment activities are implicated by a wide array of
law enforcement data-gathering activities.").
53. See CLARE GARVIE ET AL., supra note 37, at 12-15 (describing the FBI's Next
Generation Identification Interstate Photo System, the largest face recognition database
in the country, and how it contains approximately 411.9 million photos of mugshots,
drivers' license, and expanding to the State Department's passport database).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 26:1
Amendment protections.54 The majority of facial recognition programs
do not require a police officer to obtain a warrant before a search is
conducted.55
Where every smart device with a camera can record within a split
second and act as a minute-by-minute informant for the government, it
becomes worrisome that Fourth Amendment protections are subpar.
The reality is that Axon's facial recognition and analytics that
anticipate criminal activity are real-time government surveillance. Take
major metropolitan cities-like Chicago-for example. The city is a
place where the government would have a "fuller point of view from the
public," as Axon promotes,56 if facial recognition software was installed
on Chicago's camera networks since it is equipped with 10,000
surveillance cameras." The activation of facial recognition software
would empower the government to "track someone's movements
retroactively or in realtime, in secret, and by using technology that is
not covered by the warrant requirements of existing state geolocation
privacy laws."5 8
Surveillance technology that does not require a physical intrusion,
such as installing a GPS location tracker to a person, is perceived as
less harmful, but the outcomes are just as severe. In United State v.
Jones, law enforcement agents were investigating the defendant for
trafficking in narcotics.59 While the defendant's car was parked in a
public lot, the government installed a GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage and tracked his location for twenty-eight days-without
authorization of a valid warrant.60 The Supreme Court held that putting
a GPS tracker on the defendant's vehicle for twenty-eight days, which
exceeded the ten day warrant, violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment protections.6 1  In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor
54. See generally CLARE GARVIE ET AL., supra note 37 (discussing the specific
deficiencies of unregulated, mass data collection to be used for facial recognition, and how
they are producing vast constitutional and civil liberties violations).
55. See CLARE GARVIE ET AL., supra note 37, at 35 ("To date, however, not a single state
or federal court has considered the question of whether a face recognition search
constitutes a search for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, or an analogous provision
in a state constitution.").
56. Kof'man, supra note 5.
57. See CLARE GARVIE ET AL., supra note 37, at 22 ("In a city equipped with real-time
face recognition, every person who walks by a street surveillance camera-or a police worn
body camera-may have her face searched against a watchlist.").
58. Id.
59. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402-04 (2012).
60. See id. at 403-04.
61. See id. at 404 (emphasizing that there was a physical intrusion when the
government placed the GPS device on the defendant's car); see id. (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting that physical intrusion in not a requirement to many forms of
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recognized that knowing the government is watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms, which should be taken into account for societal
expectations.6 2 Justice Sotomayor perceives one purpose of privacy is the
collective right of protecting democracy, similar to Julie Cohen's
perspective.63
Facial recognition in camera networks and anticipatory analytics of
criminal activity will leave no room for obscurity or anonymity.
Although these cameras are in public places and generally courts do not
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in public,6 4 an individual
should still have the autonomy to seek obscurity and anonymity in
public places by merging into the situational landscape.65  The
distinction between private and public figures goes to show that society
expects the freedom to seek obscurity or anonymity, even in public
places.66 Society reasonably expects more privacy as a private citizen in
public than a public figure or celebrity. Yet, in a society saturated with
cameras and technology like Axon's, the societal expectation of privacy
will continue to deteriorate.
Furthermore, the ACLU and Witness, a video advocacy
organization, are using the same type of software applications that Axon
is promoting to record police interactions for accountability purposes. 67
The ACLU's mobile application automatically uploads a cell phone video
to a server in real time. 68 In addition to Axon and the government
surveillance these days and putting more emphasis on the precision of a GPS device and
the length it was employed without an authorized warrant).
62. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
63. See Cohen, supra note 46, at 1425. (describing how freedom of intellectual
expression is essential to a free, democratic nation).
64. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) (noting that a picture
taken in a public place has no reasonable expectation of privacy); see also, e.g., Neff v.
Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (noting Neff was photographed in a sporting
event, a public place where there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy).
65. See generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967) (describing privacy in
various states, such as solitude, intimacy, anonymity, reserve, and functions of privacy as
personal autonomy, individuality, emotional release of social roles, and limited and
protected communications).
66. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 45, at 7; see also generally New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing how public figures should expect less privacy
than private individuals).
67. See Kofman, supra note 5 (responding to failures to release police body camera
footage and police purposely switching off or failing to activate body cameras, advocacy
organizations deployed their own apps and resources to capture police interactions and
implement mass video collection).
68. Id.
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mobilizing facial recognition software, the ACLU maintains its own
cache of video surveillance too.69
As more entities begin to utilize real-time video surveillance
technology and it becomes more accessible to the general public, the
Fourth Amendment will fail to protect citizens. In Kyllo v. United
States, the police used a thermal imager to scan the defendant's house
for high-intensity lamps that would indicate marijuana production-
without a warrant.70 The court held that the use of a sense-enhancing
technology to obtain information regarding the interior of the home was
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and grounded its decision on the
fact that the device was not in general use and that the sense-enhancing
technology was targeted in an area of utmost importance for privacy
protections, the sanctity of the home. 1 To the contrary, in Dow
Chemical v. United States, the company denied the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) a second inspection, so the EPA hired an aerial
photographer to fly an aircraft over the facility; yet, the court held that
such surveillance was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.7 2 The
court reasoned that the photographs did not reveal intimate details
sufficient to raise constitutional concerns and further described that a
disparity exists between a home and a commercial property."3
Applying the reasoning in Kyllo and Dow to a Fourth Amendment
analysis for Axon's technology produces grave outcomes. If more entities
use real-time video surveillance, facial recognition, and anticipatory
criminal activity analytics, it could be declared a device in general use
(unlike the thermal imager in Kyllo) and be deprived of Fourth
Amendment protections. The absence of intimate details in the Dow
reasoning could lead to holdings that video surveillance does not reveal
anything private, because there is no expectation of privacy in public.
The growth of surveillance technologies, coupled with the lack of
69. Id. (describing the purpose of the ACLU photo and video cloud cache is to enhance
police accountability and combat the insufficiency of inadequate police body cameras, since
the body worn cameras are not being used effectively for police transparency).
70. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-31 (2001) (discussing the capabilities of a
thermal imager to penetrate through the walls of a home and gain intelligence, such as
the heat levels used to detect presence of human bodies or in this case, growing lamps).
71. Id. at 33-34 ("It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.").
72. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986) (describing that the
aerial photographer was acquired to capture photographs of the commercial complex that
the EPA was denied access to for a second inspection).
73. See Id. at 231 (noting that the photographs were similar to those commonly used in
mapmaking and any person with an airplane would be able to take the same type of aerial
pictures).
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oversight and Fourth Amendment protections, will continue to erode
privacy expectations.
CHINA'S SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM TURNED TO SOCIAL CONTROL IS NOT
A FARFETCHED REALITY FOR THE UNITED STATES
China is launching a social credit system that aims to tie each
individual with a numerical score that reflects their social
trustworthiness. 74 This may seem farfetched to Westerners, however,
the United States has implemented Credit Scores-numerical
calculations describing a person's ability to secure loans, financial well-
being, and much more, for more than seventy years. 75 Mass data
collection provides the means to accomplish China's social score system:
where such a score will effect what people may do, where they may go,
who they may associate with, and virtually all aspects of life. 76 In a
world of mass data collection, every transaction initiated online or with
a credit card will be monitored and evaluated; from time spent at
locations, to interactions with others, as well as reading, will be
monitored and evaluated as well.77 This concept of mass data collection
is not so farfetched considering the capabilities of data giants like
Google, Facebook, health tracking apps like Fitbit, and all of the
Internet of Things devices that are only beginning to saturate daily life.
"But now imagine a system where all these behaviours are rated as
either positive or negative and distilled into a single number, according
to rules set by the government. That would create your Citizen Score
and it would tell everyone whether or not you were trustworthy.
78
China's social score system will negatively affect the entire
population by altering all facets of human behavior. Chinese citizens
have no opt out option; they are forced to engage with the scoring
system;7 9 and it would behoove them to take it seriously. Their score will
determine eligibility for a job, loan, where their children will be able to
go to school, or even who will be willing to associate with them, as a
friend, a dating partner, or even just an acquaintance.80 Monitoring and
evaluating shopping habits of an individual can result in the
74. See Botsman, supra note 6 (describing in detail the complex standards that the
government is setting to rate the behavior of Chinese citizens).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. (describing how China's Citizen Score is voluntary now, but will be
mandatory by 2020).
80. See id.
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government nudging citizens away from purchases and behaviors that
the government deems negative, such as buying and playing video
games.81 When speech is monitored through social media and online
messages, a citizen will be incentivized to say nice things about the
Chinese government because it makes their score go up, but if a citizen
says something distasteful, not only will that individual's score
decrease, but the score of those who are associated with the distasteful
speaker will also go down.82 In addition to the clear incentives to act
according to the government's imposed social standards, the system
establishes a reward system to further encourage citizens to achieve a
higher score.83 The government, which intends to use high scores as
status symbols, will reward those who reach a certain score with "elite"
access to loans; VIP check-in at hotels and airports; and the ability to
bypass documentation requirements for traveling internationally, such
as Singapore. 84
Botsman emphasizes the effects of such a system by stating that
those who choose not to comply with the government's social standards
will be penalized.
[P]eople with low ratings will have slower internet
speeds; restricted access to restaurants, nightclubs or
golf courses; and the removal of the right to travel freely
abroad with, I quote, 'restrictive control on consumption
within holiday areas or travel businesses.' Scores will
influence a person's rental applications, their ability to
get insurance or a loan and even social-security benefits.
Citizens with low scores will not be hired by certain
employers and will be forbidden from obtaining some
jobs, including in the civil service, journalism and legal
fields, where of course you must be deemed
trustworthy. 85
Shoshana Zuboff coined the term surveillance capitalism when she
described the explosion of big data and how the private sector has
81. See id.
82. See id. ("[A] person's own score will also be affected by what their online friends say
and do, beyond their own contact with them. If someone they are connected to online posts
a negative comment, their own score will also be dragged down.").
83. See id.
84. See id. ("I think the best way to understand the system is as a sort of bastard love
child of a loyalty scheme." (quoting Rogier Creemers)).
85. Id. ("In February 2017, [China's] Supreme People's Court announced that 6.15
million of its citizens had been banned from taking flights over the past four years for
social misdeeds.").
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exploited big data to predict and modify human behavior-all to
increase profit.86 China's leading companies in surveillance capitalism
are data giants that are dangerously flirting with China's dynamic of
communist oversight and capitalist can-do.87 China Rapid Finance and
Sesame Credit, the data giants, are developing systems and algorithms
that would grant the Chinese government overarching power to spy on
and control the citizenry.88 A government that monitors the daily
activities of their citizens-what they buy, read, watch, post on social
media, who they talk to, where they go, how much time they spend
playing video games-seems insane, even radical. But what is equally
profound is the realization that the United States is not too far away
from such a surveillance state.
Evidently, American and Chinese privacy values drastically differ.
When Westerners hear about China's social scoring system, they may be
appalled by the level of governmental control and the privacy invasions.
Yet, the mass data collection capabilities in the United States have
parallels to China's system. In addition to FICO scores, which
determines many financial decisions such as whether a U.S. citizen can
get a loan or buy a house,89 the United States utilizes a numerical rating
scale for restaurants, movies, books, and even doctors.90 Algorithms are
abundant in the United States-from Facebook's facial recognition for
automatically tagging people in pictures to the National Security
Agency using predictive algorithms to determine who is a threat or
risk.91 Technology and the socialization to accept privacy invasions of
technological resources is gradually moving the United States closer to
the Chinese system.
In defense of such predictions, one may assert that even if the
technology can achieve the same type of mass data collection as China's
system, certainly U.S. laws would not allow for such government
intrusion and privacy invasions. The United States puts more value on
freedom from government intrusion compared to China; but if U.S. case
law is applied to China's social credit system in certain contexts, China's
tactics may not be deemed unconstitutional.
First, under the Third-party Doctrine, the majority of the data the
Chinese government wants to collect is already in the possession of
86. See Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an
Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 75-76 (2015).
87. See Botsman, supra note 6.
88. See id.
89. See id. (discussing how credit scores have been around for more than seventy years
in the United States but such a system has not existed in China since the majority of
Chinese citizens cannot get credit, or credit history).
90. See id.
91. See id.
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third parties, which would lack U.S. Fourth Amendment protections.92
Data disclosed to a third party includes all activity conducted online
(purchases, searches, posts, messages), on a telephone, with a bank, and
between a customer and merchant.93 Despite the autonomy trap of
utilizing phone carriers and the Internet, courts still view individuals as
voluntarily disclosing information to third parties, thereby waiving any
privacy rights.94
Second, under a content-or-no-content-based analysis, some of the
data the Chinese government desires to access would be unprotected.
Courts heavily depend on the content-or-no-content distinction when
analyzing cases regarding cell site location information (CSLI).95 Cell
phone tower data discloses where an individual's phone was and
provides the individuars location within a narrow but imprecise
radius.9 6 Because the tower data only reveals the location and not the
content of an individual's communications, police can obtain the data
without a warrant.97 The court emphasized the distinction between
content and no-content by assessing whether the data obtained by the
government was the content of the message itself or no-content
information that merely disclosed the data that was necessary to relay
the message.98 In United States v. Forrester, the court held that there
was no Fourth Amendment search where the government installed a
mirror port with only permission for a pen register, rather than a
warrant.9 9 A mirror port enables government surveillance of the sender
92. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1976) (holding that a person who
discloses information to a third-party assumes the risk that the information disclosed will
be provided to the government).
93. This is not an exhaustive list of information that individuals disclose to third-
parties, but a few examples of information that is vital to operating in society.
94. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748-50 (1979) (Marshall, T., dissenting) ("It is
idle to speak of'assuming risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have
no realistic alternative.").
95. See generally United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that
the Supreme Court recognizes a distinction between the content of a communication and
the information necessary to convey it); see also generally Zanders v. Indiana, 73 N.E.3d
178 (Ind. 2017) (discussing that the distinction between content and no-content
determines whether Fourth Amendment protections are extended).
96. See Zanders, 73 N.E. 3d at 182 (noting that this case involved only "historical,
active, network-based CSLI," not the content of defendant's communications or any high-
resolution location data).
97. See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888 ('[The government] did 'not acquire the contents of
communications.' . . . [T]he defendants' cellphones signaled the nearest cell towers-
thereby giving rise to the data obtained by the government here-solely 'as means of
establishing communication."') (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979)).
98. See id. at 887 (describing how no-content, delivery data is like the mailing address
on an envelope, which does not disclose the message, or content, inside).
99. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509-11 (9th Cir. 2008).
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and receiver addresses of the defendant's email messages, the IP
addresses of the visited websites, and the total volume of information
transmitted to or from the account. The court found the mirror port was
analogous to a pen register and declared that the to-and-from addresses
of an email message and IP addresses of websites do not reveal the
content of the message; therefore, the mirror port does not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment.0 0 Collection of no-content data in
China, such as location data, emails, and internet searches, would most
likely survive the U.S. constitutional test.
Both in the United States and China, mass data collection
threatens the dignity and inviolate personality of the citizenry.
Consistent with Spiros Simitis's assertions regarding data collection,
China is exploiting big data and personal information to enforce
standards of behavior through the social credit score regime.1 1 The
aggregation of data amounts to government surveillance that bestows
extreme government and commercial power over citizens. Knowing that
the government is constantly tracking daily activities and that each
personal decision can affect a social score, individual autonomy and
expression will be drastically chilled. 102
CONCLUSION
Axon profits from further saturating society with cameras, which in
turn aids the government in surveillance of its citizenry. Although the
criminal investigation tools, such as: Evidence.com or Cop Dropbox;
facial recognition; and algorithms that can anticipate criminal activity
may reduce costs for detective bureaus and enhance the country's crime-
solving capabilities, it should not be deployed without limitations on the
government's use. The reasonable expectation of privacy test, the
content-or-no-content distinction, and the Third-party Doctrine are
inadequate Fourth Amendment points of analysis as technology rapidly
enhances. Applying technologies and situations in the information age
against the current doctrinal backdrop contributes to the deterioration
of information privacy because the application lacks adequate
100. See id. at 511.
101. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
707, 709-10 (1987) (describing how modern forms of data collection have altered privacy
considerations, such as surveillance has lost its prominence because it becomes more and
more embedded in our daily routines. Also, information processing is developing into an
essential key for strategic manipulation of individual conduct).
102. See generally id., supra note 99 (discussing how strengthening the social control
threatens the core of democracy); see also Richards, supra note 45 (discussing the chilling
effects that surveillance has on freedom of expression, specifically relating to intellectual
expression).
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protections for individual privacy. The enhancement of technology,
coupled with the stagnate Fourth Amendment points of analysis, has
led to the socialization of younger generations to accept less privacy
throughout their daily activities since the courts are operating on a
circular analysis of societal expectations. Without doctrinal change to
limit technologies like Axon's evidence gathering portal, which
essentially establishes a perpetual line-up, the technologies will
continue to erode the expectation of privacy.
Given that the judicial tests for analyzing cases that concern
personal information do not adequately protect individual privacy, a
successful implementation of China's social scoring system in the
United States is not so farfetched. If a system that had parallels to the
social score system underway in China were to be initiated in the
United States and subsequently constitutionally challenged, the current
Supreme Court jurisprudence would likely be inadequate to fully protect
the privacy of citizens' information. The judicially created paradigms
such as the reasonable expectation of privacy, Third-party Doctrine, and
the content-or-no-content-based distinction all give way to mass data
collection and continue to influence the interrelated and often tenuous
relationship between privacy and the law.
